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IT Services for Logistics and Freight Companies

The fastest-growing way to steal a truckload now starts in an email account. Somebody takes a carrier's identity, passes a broker's vetting, books the load and sends it somewhere else, and nobody touches a lock the whole time.
Freight fraud is an identity problem
Systems watched around the clock
Warehouse coverage that survives a move
Why this matters

What freight lost in 2025, and how

$725M
Estimated cargo theft losses across 2025, up 60% on the year before. The average single loss reached $273,990, itself up 36%.
1,475%
Growth in strategic theft between 2022 and 2024, against 93% for cargo theft overall. Strategic theft is now around a third of all cargo crime, from under 5% in 2010.
1,218
Incidents in California during 2025, more than any other state. If you move freight through this state you are operating in the worst of it.
Loss and incident figures from Verisk CargoNet's 2025 analysis, which adjusts for delayed reporting by comparing 2025 data as at 12 January 2026 with 2024 data as at 12 January 2025. Strategic theft growth from trucking industry reporting on the same period. Neither is our data.
How the load actually goes missing

Nobody cut a lock. They logged in.

Strategic theft works through paperwork and credentials, which is why it grew fifteen times faster than the kind involving a crowbar. Every step below is a step your IT can make harder.

How they get in
Your own mailbox books the load
The cleanest version of this crime uses a real account. Somebody gets into a carrier's or a broker's email, watches the traffic for a while, then books shipments from inside the business using the address everyone already trusts. The shipper sees a familiar sender, correct signature block and a history of prior messages, because all of it is real. Nothing about the message looks wrong, so the controls that matter are the ones that stop the account being taken in the first place and the ones that notice a login from somewhere strange.
The load board password reset that is not one
A message arrives that looks like your load board asking you to reset a password, and the link goes to a copy of the site that harvests whatever gets typed into it. Dispatchers work fast and click fast, which is exactly what the message is built for. Two things blunt it: filtering that catches most of them before anybody sees one, and short repeated training so the ones that get through meet somebody who has seen the pattern recently.
The tracking portal is a target too
Access to a tracking portal tells a thief which trailer is worth taking and where it will be. The same access supports spoofed location data that hides a route change for long enough to matter. These accounts tend to be shared, rarely reviewed and often left active for people who moved on, because nobody thinks of a tracking login as a security asset. It is one, and it wants the same treatment as your email.
What stops it
Multifactor on every account that touches a load
Email first, because that is where the impersonation starts, then the load boards, the tracking portals and anything that can change where a truck goes. The gap we find most often is not the main mailbox, which usually has it. It is the shared dispatch account, the old address that still forwards, and the portal login three people know the password to. Those are the ones worth an afternoon.
A rule for changing where a truck goes
Mid-haul rerouting and banking detail changes are where the money leaves, and both usually arrive as a plausible message during a busy hour. The control is procedural and it costs nothing: a reroute or a payment change gets confirmed on a number already on file, never a number in the message asking for it. We write it down and put it where dispatch can see it, so a new hire meets the rule in their first week instead of their first incident.
Who still has access, and who left
Freight runs on turnover, seasonal staff and owner-operators who come and go. Access tends to outlast all of them. Rights get handed out by whoever was on shift and reviewed by nobody. We keep a list of who can reach what and take access away the day somebody leaves, with each person holding only the rights their job needs. It is unglamorous and it removes a whole category of problem, including the one where a former dispatcher still has the tracking portal on their phone.
The question this industry always asks

You run nights and weekends. Here is exactly what we cover, and what we do not.

Most providers answer this with two words and hope nobody reads the agreement. You are going to get the actual shape of it, because finding out at 2 AM is how a relationship ends.
Around the clock
Your systems are monitored
Servers, workstations and network gear report in continuously, every day of the year. Disks, backups, services that stopped, patches that failed. If something goes down at 3 AM the record of it starts at 3 AM, not when somebody arrives and finds it.
Around the clock
Security has a person on shift
Security alerts go to Huntress, whose analysts are on shift at every hour, and they triage and act on it there and then. That matters here because the theft described above happens through an account takeover, and an account takeover at 2 AM is the one you most want interrupted.
Weekdays, 5 AM to 6 PM Pacific
The help desk
Ordinary support runs on staffed hours, and we are not going to pretend otherwise on a page you will hold us to. A 5 AM start covers a dispatch shift that begins before dawn. If your operation needs a person reachable outside those hours, say so early and we will price it honestly or tell you we are the wrong fit.
The full detail of what gets watched, what raises an alert and what happens next is on the monitoring page.
Who we do this for

Child Truck Line, and the backup that went home in a bag

Child Truck Line has hauled full truckload freight across Washington and Oregon since 1979, and Child Logistics is their brokerage division. When we assessed them in 2018 the nightly backup was a physical copy that a member of staff carried home. The server dropped a few times a month, and each time the operation stopped for hours because access ran through one person.

What we did was unglamorous. We moved the data to cloud services and replaced the infrastructure, with real processes put around both. Then we designed and oversaw a Wi-Fi network across their new warehouse so inventory could be scanned live on the floor.

Over the years that followed they moved from an 80,000 square foot building to 385,000, roughly tripled revenue and more than doubled headcount. We are not going to tell you IT did that. What we will say is that the technology stopped being the thing holding it back, and it kept up as they grew.
In their words
“We were constrained by an archaic system, relying on inferior equipment and technology with a rat's nest of wires in the backroom. We knew we needed to make significant changes so we could compete and grow.”
James Carroll, President, Child Truck Line
The whole engagement is written up as a case study.
Common questions
Do you support us outside business hours?
Is cargo theft an IT problem?
Our warehouse Wi-Fi drops when the scanners move to the back racks. Is that fixable?
What happens to dispatch if the internet goes down?
Do you work with our transportation and warehouse management systems?
We are a broker rather than an asset carrier. Does any of this apply?
Which of your dispatch accounts is missing multifactor?
It is almost never the main mailbox. It is the shared one.